



a} 







Chamber ee Commerce 
ad 2 the 
= Ptate oi New Park 


oes 


\ 


ea: e regular monthly meeting of the Chamber of Com~ 
“e Shoccte ofthe State of New Yo: ck, held December 4, 1919, 


the following report and resolution, submitted by the Ex- 
ecutive Committee and the Committee on Finance ‘and Cur= 
rency, were adopted: ; 


REPORT RESPECTING TREATY OF PEACE 


To the Chamber of Commerce: 





The Chamber of Commerce bf the State of New York, in 
common with the business men of the whole nation, believes that 
as a people we are now confronted in the world of morals and 
in the world of trade with a crisis similar to that which we faced 
on the 6th of April, 1917. We then realized suddenly that we 
had well-nigh waited too long, and for nineteen months after 
that date, the question of what the results of our delinquency 


might be, hung in the balance. 


On the 1Jth of November, 1918, came victory. We again felt, 
as we had not for some time surely felt, that we had a right to 
have pride in our descent from the men who fashioned our 


Constitution in 1787 and preserved it in 1865. 


Victory not only restored our self-respect; it also brought 
duties and opportunities. Our declaration that we sought none 
of the usual spoils of war, no territory, no indemnities, placed 
us in a position of moral leadership. We fought not alone to 
preserve our self respect and to defend free institutions, but to 
end war. In harmony with the .unselfish motives that moved 
us we were as a people insistent in our demands that a post- 
bellum program should be adopted by the free nations of the 
world that would make a repetition of the horrors of 1914-1918 
impossible. The Peace Delegates at Versailles undertook to 


meet this demand. , 
_Whep we made the demandit is probable that few of us fully 


ye 
aghyae- 
a 


realized what that demand involved. It necessarily involved some 
sacrifice of long cherished precedents and practices. It involved 
at least the establishment of a council of free nations with such 
power of moral and economic suasion, with such machinery 
for the adjudication of international disputes, as would surely 
lessen the probability of war. The Versailles Treaty sought, 
even though its machinery may well seem to some of us as 
lacking in perfection, to achieve these ends. 

The Senate of the United States, faced with the specific pro- 
visions of a compact which demanded some departure from the 
well settled practices of the Government hesitated, debated, 
delayed. And finally to the grave concern and even alarm of 
the country at large, not only was the Treaty rejected, but 
no compromise treaty was left for discussion. This has created 
what we have called a crisis in morals and trade. As a conse- 
quence of this unhappy condition we are losing moral leader- 
ship; the legitimate commerce which victory assured us is 
slipping away. The prosperity of America’s export trade is 
largely dependent upon the extension of credits to our cus- 
tomers abroad. But pending a condition of peace, and the 
establishment of a known basis for the continuance of interna- 
tional trade, no adequate credit plans can possibly be established. 
The alarm of the whole world of business over this protracted 
delay is evidenced by the continued and wholly unprecedented 
fall in the rates of exchange—a fall almost as detrimental for 
us as exporters, as it is for the unfortunate peoples of Europe 
who are unable to buy from us the tone and materials which 
they so sorely need. 

It is not the duty of this body to place the responsibility for 
this condition. Rather, our problem lies in the circumstances in 
which we find ourselves and in the practical measures that ought 
to be taken to solve the problem. 

Whatever the moral or trade effect of that fact may be, the 
Treaty as presented cannot command the votes necessary to its 
ratification, but the situation thus created is intolerable. Unless 
the parties to the controversy make concessions we shall soon 
stand before the world self-indicted as governmentally incom- 
petent. 

To drop the Treaty and seek a direct and separate peace 
with Germany would not only imperil American business inter- 
ests but would be a base abandonment of our Allies and of our 
own principles. The only alternative is mutual concession by 
both the President and the Senate. 


~ 





We want peace. We want it speedily; but we want an hon- 
orable peace. Many parts of Europe are in desperate plight. 
A peace in which we wrap ourselves in the robes of isolation 
and self-interest would be as dishonorable as further. delay would 
have been in our decision to enter the war on April 6th, 1917; 
Therefore, be it 


Resolved, That some form of international covenant which 
seeks to prevent war is a moral necessity ; 


That the differences between the President and the Senate 
should be composed without delay by such mutual concessions 
regarding reservations as may be necessary in the Treaty to se- 
cure ratification. 


Executive 


We.pInG Rine, Chairman) 

ALFRED C. BEDFORD 

Detos W. CooKE 

IrvinGc T. BusH 

Darwin P. KINGSLEY 

Cuartes L. BERNHEIMER pr ae 

Howarp C. SMITH 

ALFRED FE. MArLING | 

Puinip A. S. FRANKLIN } 

WiLutaAM H. Porter 

EucEeNiIus H. OUTERBRIDGE 

WILLIAM WoopwARD 
J 


THomas W. LAMONT 
Otto T. BANNARD 


Of the 
Committee on 
Finance and 


Pau, M. WarBurRG Currency 
Attest: 
CHARLES T. GWYNNE, ALFRED E. Martina, 
Secretary. President. 


New York, December 4, 1919. 











